Detail publikace

Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model

Si, C. Fan, Y.V. Woon, K.S. Čuček, L. Dokl, M. Varbanov, P.S.

Anglický název

Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model

Typ

článek v časopise ve Scopus, Jsc

Jazyk

en

Originální abstrakt

Life Cycle Assessment is the primary approach to quantify the environmental impacts of plastics. However, it encounters challenges in allocating the impacts of respective stages to stakeholders, especially for systems involving multi-cycles and end-of-life stages. This study proposes a framework integrating Cooperative Game Theory to assess and allocate the greenhouse gas footprint among stakeholders. The applied concepts are the Shapley Value, Nucleolus and Core. The applicability is demonstrated by a case study of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) with four recycling and landfill scenarios. The Shapley Value, which highlights fair allocation, suggests ∼ 792–1164 kg of unburdening CO2eq/t PET (∼ 47 % net recycling credits) assigned to material producers, 844.5–1216.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to product manufacturers, and the remaining ∼ 2–3 % to users. The Nucleolus stresses satisfactory results in 1531.5–2275.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to material producers, constituting ∼ 90 % of the total credits. The allocation does not change the total footprints; however, it is essential for the stakeholders’ cooperation in environmental initiatives.

Anglický abstrakt

Life Cycle Assessment is the primary approach to quantify the environmental impacts of plastics. However, it encounters challenges in allocating the impacts of respective stages to stakeholders, especially for systems involving multi-cycles and end-of-life stages. This study proposes a framework integrating Cooperative Game Theory to assess and allocate the greenhouse gas footprint among stakeholders. The applied concepts are the Shapley Value, Nucleolus and Core. The applicability is demonstrated by a case study of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) with four recycling and landfill scenarios. The Shapley Value, which highlights fair allocation, suggests ∼ 792–1164 kg of unburdening CO2eq/t PET (∼ 47 % net recycling credits) assigned to material producers, 844.5–1216.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to product manufacturers, and the remaining ∼ 2–3 % to users. The Nucleolus stresses satisfactory results in 1531.5–2275.5 kgCO2eq/t PET to material producers, constituting ∼ 90 % of the total credits. The allocation does not change the total footprints; however, it is essential for the stakeholders’ cooperation in environmental initiatives.

Klíčová slova anglicky

Cooperative Game Theory; End-of-life management; Environmental footprint allocation; Life Cycle Assessment; Multi-cycle recycling; Plastics

Vydáno

01.04.2024

Nakladatel

Elsevier B.V.

Místo

Elsevier B.V.

ISSN

0921-3449

Číslo

203

Počet stran

10

BIBTEX


@article{BUT187946,
  author="Chunyan {Si} and Yee Van {Fan} and Petar Sabev {Varbanov},
  title="Environmental footprint allocation in driving plastic avoidance and sustainable recycling: Game-theoretic model",
  year="2024",
  number="203",
  month="April",
  publisher="Elsevier B.V.",
  address="Elsevier B.V.",
  issn="0921-3449"
}